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Abstract 
 
This paper explains about the design and 
implementation of Identity Based Encryption (IBE) in 
web-based Voting application.  IBE is a completely 
new approach to the problem of encryption which was 
found on the traditional Public Key Infrastructure. It 
can be used on any arbitrary string as a public key, 
enabling data to be protected without the need for 
certificates and reduction of infrastructure cost due to 
certificates database maintenance.  Protection 
implemented in this application is a key server that 
controls the mapping of identities to decryption keys 
where the key is only one-time pad implementation.  By 
using the IBE technique, authentication and security 
can be preserved in the web-based Voting application 
where it provides integrity, authenticity, anonymity and 
confidentiality in this application. 
 
Keywords—Identity Based Encryption (IBE), Public 
Key Infrastructure (PKI), Public Key Cryptography 
(PKC), Public Key Generator (PKG), Identity Public Key 
Cryptography (ID-PKC), web-based Voting application. 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
In modern democratic society, voting is one of the 
important duties of a citizen. The term voting does not 
only suggest the public governmental election but it 
also includes all election under commercial 
organizations, student councils, board elections, and 
etc. People was always being discourage to participate 
because of the aspect of time consuming for presenting 
themselves to the polling station. Therefore, e-voting 
which mainly consisted of web-based voting and 
electronic machine voting is beginning to be widely 
deployed. However, the controversial issues of 
deploying the e-voting in a public governmental 
election has gather much debate from different parties 
mainly regarding the security and confidential issues of 
the application. Gartner Inc. has noted that almost 75 
percent of attacks are tunneling through web 
applications [9].  Web application security is a 
significant privacy and risk compliance concern that 
remains largely unaddressed. 
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
 
Security is the main issues to be considered 
when developing an application of web-based voting.  
Voter integrity, authentication, anonymity and 
confidentiality were those among the security aspects 
that will be included in this implementation. 
 
1) Integrity (Completeness) 
 
Completeness can be defined as all votes must 
be counted correctly and accurately [4]. In a web-based 
voting application, a voter could not see the flow of the 
vote they cast, unlike the traditional paper-vote scheme 
where the vote is put in a locked vote-box.  In order to 
provide the voter confidence towards their vote in 
terms of few issues such as uncounted vote and vote 
being tampered, the integrity issue should be 
implemented during the process of the transmission to 
the vote server. 
 
2) Authentication (Eligibility) 
 
The web-based application needs to 
authenticate the voter before the vote is being cast to 
provide the eligibility service where it refers to only a 
legal individual should be allowed to vote or 
participate in the voting process [4].  Based on the 
current authentication used in web-based voting 
application, it only depends on the login id and login 
password.  Hence it will expose the system to 
unauthorized voter to participate in the voting process. 
 
3) Anonymity (Unreusability) 
 
Anonymity or Unreusability is defined as only 
once voting process per voter is allowed [4].  Hence 
implementation of unique identity as the authentication 
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method should be integrated in the system to prevent 
repeated voter registration. 
 
4) Confidentiality (Privacy) 
 
Confidentiality or Privacy in a voting process 
can be explained as votes and vote’s content secrecy 
[4].  In web-based voting application, only authorized 
voter can access the protected voting information.  
 
2.  Overview of PKC, IBE and web-based 
voting application 
 
2.1 Public Key Cryptography (PKC) 
 
Cryptography is the study of “mathematical” 
systems involving two kinds of security problems: 
privacy and authentication [3].  To overcome the 
problems found in the symmetric cryptography, the 
idea of Public Key Cryptography was first introduced 
by [3].  In 1978 and 1979, Rivest, Adelman and Shamir 
published their seminar papers on public key 
cryptography which explained a practical method of the 
implementation of Public Key Cryptography, this could 
be found in [6]. This system differs from the traditional 
ciphers, it make use of two keys in the process of 
encryption and decryption. That would be a public key, 
and a private key. 
 
Based on [3] and [6] on the concept of Public 
Key Infrastructure, if Alice wishes to encrypt and send 
a message to Bob, Alice would have to obtain Bob’s 
Public Key and encrypt the message with Bob’s Public 
Key. Thus, the message can only be read by Bob. This 
is because the decryption on the message can only be 
done with Bob’s Private Key which only Bob knows 
and no one else. However, this approach has a major 
weakness. How can Alice be assured that the Public 
Key she has obtained is indeed Bob’s Public Key? To 
solve this problem, the public key certificate is used. A 
certificate is issued by a trusted third party called the 
Certification Authority (CA). With the solution with 
CA, Bob can present his or her public key to the 
authority in a secure manner and obtain a certificate. 
Bob can then publish the certificate. Alice which needs 
to obtain Bob’s public key can obtain the certificate 
and verify that whether the public key is valid and 
indeed belongs to Bob. By this, Alice can be assured 
that the message that she is sending to Bob can only be 
decrypted and read by Bob and no one else. 
 
According to [5], the maintenance and storage 
which is needed for the database of certificates and the 
associated keys has become a difficulty in the 
traditional PKI. Because of the nature of traditional 
PKI of using certificates to verify keys, traditional PKI 
will be inferior in the application of a distributed 
system where the management of key revocation 
mechanism is difficult. One of the ways for the 
traditional PKI to overcome this hurdles is to use a 
short-lived certificate, and a short-lived certificates will 
introduce a high maintenance cost for the key and 
certificate updates in the traditional PKI. However, by 
using the Identity Based Encryption the problem in 
which was introduced in traditional PKI would be 
solved because the certificate is eliminated. 
 
Based on [5], another drawback of the 
traditional PKI would be the key pair setup on both the 
sender and receiver that needs to be done before any 
communication using the key pair could be continued. 
In traditional PKI, the public key is generated at the 
same time with the private key. This would mean that 
in order for A to send an encrypted message to B, B 
would have to first setup its public key and private key 
in the system. This drawback is solved by using 
Identity Based Encryption as the public key for Identity 
Based Encryption could be generated at a different 
time with the private key and by anyone who wish to 
encrypt a message.  As a solution to all the problems of 
certificate in traditional PKI, hence the idea of Identity 
Based Encryption is presented. 
 
2.2 Identitiy Based Encryption (IBE) 
 
Identity Based Encryption (IBE) is an 
encryption scheme where the public key is based on an 
arbitrary string.  IBE has remained a scheme which 
does not have a practical method to implement it since 
[8] has introduced it. Until recently in a paper, [2] 
describe an IBE system using the Weil Pairing that 
solved many of the inefficiencies of previous systems. 
The system was called “Stanford IBE system”. This 
cryptosystem has chosen cipher text security in the 
random oracle model assuming an elliptic curve variant 
of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem. 
Additionally, the performance of this system is 
comparable to the performance of ElGamal encryption. 
Therefore, the Boneh solution is the first practical IBE 
scheme which involve Setup - this function generates 
global system parameters and generates a master-key; 
Extract - this call uses the master-key to generate a 
private key that corresponds to an arbitrary public key 
string ID; Encrypt - takes a message and encrypts it 
using the public key ID; Decrypt - decrypts a message 
using the corresponding private key. 
 
Identity-Based Encryption is advantageous in 
key management comparing to the certificate based 
PKI. In traditional asymmetric mechanisms, the key 
pair is generated from random information unrelated to 
the method identifying that key pair within the system 
[5]. The public key generation in Identity Based 
Encryption can also be invoked at the different time 
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with the private key in the system where the public key 
in traditional PKI could only be generated at the same 
time when private key is generated. 
 
In Identity Based Encryption, a sender can 
send a secure message to a receiver just using the 
receiver's identity information, even before the receiver 
obtains his private key from the Private Key Generator 
(PKG). This is very unlikely in the traditional PKI 
where user must establish their key pair before a sender 
can send an encrypted message to the receiver. By 
using the information such as receiver position in an 
organization, the validity date, and etc, IBE is flexible 
in the providing the application in public key 
revocation and delegation of encryption key. IBE 
accomplishes expiration by specifying a valid time 
segment during which a public key is valid. For 
example, When Alice send a mail to Bob, Alice would 
use the public key consisting of the public identifier 
and a valid time, such as key: bob@hotmail.com || 
current-year. In doing so Bob can use his private key 
during the current year only. Once a year Bob needs to 
obtain a new private key from the PKG. Hence, we get 
the effect of annual private key expiration. Note that 
unlike the existing PKI, Alice does not need to obtain a 
new certificate from Bob every time Bob refreshes his 
certificate. 
 
 In “Stanford IBE System”, [2] describes that 
IBE achieve the delegation of decryption key by 
implementing Threshold Key Issuing. This is done by 
not placing the Master Keys in a single location but 
rather distributing it to different entities.  [1] has 
concluded that by using Identity Based Encryption, the 
complexity and cost of managing and establishing the 
public keys and certificates is significantly reduced.  As 
in conclusion, although research interest in Identity 
Public Key Cryptography (ID-PKC) is very strong at 
the moment, it is a relatively new technology in 
comparison to PKI. 
 
2.3 Web-based Voting application 
 
Web-based Voting is the act of casting a vote 
using a system that employs internet based protocols 
[7]. Internet voting has been referred to as the ultimate 
challenge in network security and data encryption.  
Web-based voting is inevitability a convenient means 
for a voter to cast their vote, but the existing web-based 
application has often fail to provide the needed 
anonymity and verification which is vital in a voting 
application. The environment that internet voting 
operates within create unique security concerns. Vote 
integrity and confidentiality can be protected while 
votes are transmitted over the Internet through the use 
of digital signature and encryption technology [10]. 
The security requirement of a web-based voting is 
defined as in [4] are completeness, soundness, privacy, 
unreusability, eligibility, fairness, and verifiability.  
 
3.  Design 
 
The e-Voting system is divided into eight modules 
which focus on the privacy and authentication as the 
security requirements of the voting process using 
Identity Based Encryption.  The modules are Voter 
Registration Module, Voter login Module, Voting 
Module, Infrared SMS Module, Encryption/Decryption 
Module, Vote Server Module, PKG Server Module and 
Vote Tabulation  Module. 
 
3.1 Voter registration module 
 
e-Voting System requires the voter to register 
in order to participate in the election to obtain their 
authorization. Principles use in the e-Voting System is 
“one-certificate, one vote”. Identity Based Encryption 
(IBE) is implemented where the usage of certificate is 
eliminated and replaced by the user’s unique identity. 
This system generate the combination of National 
Identification Number and email address as the user’s 
unique identity. 
 
3.2 Voter Login Module 
 
Eligible voter will have their registered Login 
ID and password to log into the system successfully. 
 
3.3 Voting Module 
 
This is the main part of this system where the 
voter cast their vote. In this module, voter will be able 
to make their selection and submit the vote to the 
server by using IBE encryption to secure the 
transmission.  
 
3.4 Infrared SMS Module 
 
This module is responsible to send 
confirmation SMS to voter once the vote is confirmed 
and saved in database. SMS will be sent via infrared 
using an infrared-enabled mobile phone. 
 
3.5 Encryption/Decryption Module 
 
This module is responsible for all the 
cryptography function. Vote will be encrypted and 
decrypted using the function in this module. 
 
Conference on Information Technology Research and Applications 2007 (CITRA 2007), 4
th
 – 5
th
 April 2007, Selangor, Malaysia 
 
 216 
3.6 Vote Server Module 
The Vote server module is used to keep track 
of all votes’ transaction. If vote transaction exists, this 
module will call the decryption module to decrypt the 
vote and save the vote to the database. 
 
3.7 PKG Server Module 
 
This module is responsible for generating key 
pairs and accommodate key request in the e-Voting 
System. 
 
3.8 Vote Tabulation Module 
 
The function of this module is to count the 
encrypted vote which was sent to the vote server. The 
tabulation must be accurate to ensure completeness in 
the system. Vote must be counted only once. The 
encrypted vote which was kept in the vote server can 
only be decrypted by using the private key of the vote 
server and will be stored in the database server. 
 
4.  Implementation 
 
The implementation of e-Voting system includes IIS 
version 5.1, Microsoft Access 2003, Java Virtual 
Machine, and Java Development Kit running on 
Windows XP.  It can be illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1 e-Voting System environment 
 
4.1 Server configuration 
 
e-Voting System is a web-based application 
which is developed using the ASP (Active Server Page) 
language for the web component. Thus, in order to be 
able to start writing and viewing ASP web page, the 
web server is required to be running. Microsoft IIS 
(Internet Information Service) version 5.1 is installed 
to the workstation to turn it into a web server. Infrared 
Adapter must be connected to the server for the 
confirmation of voting process by sending SMS to the 
voter. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 e-Voting System Server Panel 
 
 
Figure 3 e-Voting System PKG Panel 
 
4.2 Platform configuration 
Scripting language using Java is used to 
develop e-Voting System in the client –server aspect. 
The core module in E-Voting which is the Identity 
Based Encryption and Decryption module is coded in 
java using the technique of Applet and java GUI to 
embed  the module into the webpage.  
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The whole process of the e-Voting System can be 
illustrated as shown in Figure 5 below. 
 
 
Figure 5 DFD of e-Voting System 
 
 
5. Conclusion and future works 
 
The implementation of IBE concept based on 
the Elliptic Curve Cryptography in e-Voting System 
has provides integrity, authenticity, anonymity and 
confidentiality in web-based voting application.   It is 
a new approach to the problem of encryption which 
was found on the traditional Public Key Infrastructure.  
. It use any arbitrary string as a public key, enabling 
data to be protected without the need for certificates 
and reduction of infrastructure cost due to certificates 
database maintenance.  Protection implemented in this 
system is a key server that controls the mapping of 
identities to decryption keys.  From this result, by 
eliminating the need for certificates, IBE removes the 
hurdles of PKI: certificate lookup, lifecycle 
management, Certificate Revocation Lists, and cross-
certification issues. IBE's simplicity enables it to be 
used in ways PKI could not where IBE can be used to 
build security systems that are more dynamic, 
lightweight and scalable.  
 
References 
 
[1] Joonsang Baek et al, “A Survey of Identity Based 
Encryption”, School of Network Computing, Monash 
University 
 
[2] Boneh and Franklin (2001), “Identity Based Encryption 
from the Weil Pairing” 
 
[3] W. Diffie and M. Hellman (1976), “New Directions in 
Cryptography” 
 
[4] Fujioka et al (1992), “A Practical Voting Scheme for 
Large Scale Election”, AsiaCrypt92 
 
[5] Paterson and Price, “A Comparison between Traditional 
Public Key Infrastructures and Identity-Based 
Cryptography”, Information Security Group, 
Mathematics Department, University of London 
 
[6] R.L Rivest et al. (1978), “A Method of obtaining Digital 
Signatures and Public Key Cryptosystems” 
 
[7] Ed Rodriguez (13 Dec 2001), “Security Requirements 
for Internet Voting System”, ACSAC01 
 
[8] A Shamir (1984), “Identity Based Cryptosystem and 
Signature Schemes” 
 
[9] "Airline Web Sites Seen As Riddled With Security 
Holes," Computer World, February 4, 2002. 
(http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/
story/0,10801,67973,00.html ) 
 
[10] California Internet Voting Taskforce (2000) “A Report 
on the Feasibility of Internet Voting “ 
 
